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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the judgment of the assessing authorities, but is apparently a question of fact
to be ascertained by the courts and established as any other fact. 1
Since Florida municipalities may assess the cost of local improvements
against abutting property, 2 Florida courts could be of some assistance by
interfering less in the assessing authority's determination as to when the
abutting property is benefited by the particular improvements involved. If the
assessing authorities' determination is reasonable, it should be final. While
assessment should be subject to judicial review, it is not a judicial function.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR
WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT-SECONDARY INJURY FUND
PROVISION
Claimant lost the sight of his right eye in an accident unconnected with
industry or his employment. Subsequently, while employed by the defendant,
he sustained an injury "arising out of and in the course of his employment"
which destroyed his other eye, rendering him completely blind. The deputy
commissioner found that under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act,' the claimant was permanently totally-disabled by the
latter injury alone, and imposed liability for total disability upon the de-
fendant. The employer secured a reversal of the commissioner's determination
in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and this judgment
was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On
certiorari held, that the employer is liable for the degree of disability which
would have resulted had there been no previous injury. The second-injury-fund
is liable for the balance necessary to equal compensation for total disability
even though the first injury did not occur within either industry or plaintiff's
emlployment.? Judgment affirmed. Lawson, Deputy Comrn'r v. Suwanee Fruit
& Steamship Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 503 (1949).
Determining the proper basis for computing compensation awards when
a previously-impaired-worker suffers a second injury, and as a result of the
combined injuries becomes permanently totally-disabled has been a trouble-
some prollii. 3 Not infrequently the courts adopt the view that the employee
31. Atlantic Coast line R. R. v. Lakeland, supra.
32. Prospere v. New Port Rickey, 98 FIa. 508, 124 So. 2 (1929).
1. 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), as anended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 (1946).
2. Id. k§ 908 (1) 11), 944 (In this chapter the second-injury-fund is referred to as
the special funid. This fund is filnanced by 1paymentts which every employer or his insurance
carrier is required to tmake for every injury causing the death of anl employee who left
no depenidents entitled to compensation. All finies and penalties collected under the
provisions of this act are also paid into this fund).
3. See Kossoris and Hammond, Work Performance of Physically Impaired Workers,
66 MONTIHY LABOR Ri~v. 31, 33 (Jan. 1948) ; U. S. BuiA:.wc OF L.A. STAT. BULL.. No.
564. 266 (1932); U. S. B-r.Au or LAH. STAT. BULL. No. 536, 249 (1931).
CASES NOTED
should be granted full compensation from the current employer regardless of
how the prior injury occurred-stressing the loss of earning capacity rather
than the source of the infirmity.4 While this view appears to be in complete
harmony with the liberal construction, in favor of the injured employee, given
to workmen's compensation laws, the consequences of such an interpretation
are apparent.' If an employer is compelled to pay for permanent total-dis-
ability in second injury cases, he will be reluctant, or may even refuse, to
employ partially-impaired workers.6 To prevent employers from discrimin-
ating against handicapped workers some courts grant the employee compen-
sation for the incapacity resulting from the second injury only, as if no prior
disability existed.7 Under these decisions inadequate provision is made for
the now totally-disabled employee.8 On the other hand, in order not to
encourage discrimination in hiring disabled applicants, the liability of the
employer for an injury should not be increased because of a worker's previ-
ously-impaired condition.
To resolve the inequitable consequences to both employee and employer
the special indemnity fund was devised. 9 The combined injuries are treated
as together causing permanent total-disability. However, the last employer is
liable only for such permanent partial-disability as the last injury of itself
caused. The balance of the award is made up from the second-injury-fund.10
This appears to be the best solution to the problem.1
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia irt interpreting a
similar provision in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Act held that the
employer was liable for permanent total-disability where the employee's prior
condition did not result from an accident in industry or out of previous
employment.' 2 To furnish an argument for this narrow construction of the
4. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cardillo, 127 F.2d 344 (App. D. C. 1942)
Killisnoo Packing Co. v. Scott, 14 F.2d 86 (C. C. A. 9th 1926); Congoleum Nairn v.
Brown, 158 Md. 285, 148 AtI. 220 (1930) ; In re Branconnier, 223 Mass. 273, 111 N. E.
792 (1916) ; Matter of Schwab v. Emporium Forestry Co., 216 N. Y. 712, 111 N. E.
1099 (19t5).
5. See Temperance River Co. v. Legarde, 65 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Minn. 1946)
Lehman v. Schmahl, 179 Minn. 388, 229 N. W. 553, 554 (1930).
6. E.g., Weaver v. Maxwell Motor Co., 186 Mich. 588, 152 N. W. 993 (1915); Lente
r. Luci. 2/5 Pa. 217. 119 Ati. 132 (1922); Catlett v. Chattanooga Handle Co., 163 Tenn.
343, 55 S. W.2d 257 (1932).
7. See note 6 supra.
8. See Enrico v. Oliver Iron Mining Co,, 199 Minn. 190, 191, 271 N. W. 456, 457(1937) ; Lumbermen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Gilmore, 2S8 S. W. 268, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924).
9. See Matter of State Industrial Comm'r v. Newman, 22 N. Y. 363, 367, 118 N. E,
794, 795 (1918).
10. E.g., McDonald v. Treasurer. 52 Idaho 535, 16 P.2d 988 (1932): Panther Creek
Mines, Inc. v. Industrial Conm'r, 342 111. 68, 173 N. E. 818 (1930) ; Peters v. Archer-
Daniels Midland Co., 233 Minn. 168, 26 N. W.2d 29 (1947) : Peterson v. Halvorson, 200
Minn. 253, 273 N. W. 812 (1939) ; Ravelin Mining Co. v. Viers, 200 P.2d 433 (Okla. 1948),
11. See Acee, State Legislation on Compensation for Second Injuries, 61 MONITLY
LABOR REv. 284 (Aug. 1945).
12. National Homeonathic Hospital Association v. Britton, Deputy Comm'r, 147
F.2d 561 (App. D. C. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 857 (1945) ; accord, Temper.nce fiver
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Act, the court did violence to the second-injury-fund provision. Emphasis
was placed on the inadequacy of the special fund to meet the demands which
would result from a contrary holding." In the present case an opposite result
was reached on a very similar fact situation. The value and the beneficial
effect of the second-injury-fund would have been seriously impaired if the
holding of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia had been followed.
Employers again would have been placed in the position of either assuming
the additional risk of liability or discriminating against physically handicapped
workers. A large group of war-injured lien seeking employment would have
been classified as poor business risks, thus seriously hampering their oppor-
tunity for employment.1 4
The interpretation given the second injury provision in the principal
case appears to be in accord with the avowed purpose of the Act,' and the
construction given to similar state Workmen's Compensation Acts.' 6 The
inequity and unfairness of either total liability for the employer or lack of
adequate compensation for the employee has been met by distributing the
liability over the entire industry. The physically handicapped are encouraged
to take their place in society rather than to become charges of the state.
Co. v. Legarde, 65 F. Supp. 161 (D. Minn. 1946), Compare Addotta v, Blunt, Comm'r of
Labor, 114 N. J. L. 85, 176 Ati. 105 (1934), with Voessler v. Palm Fetchteler & Co., 120
N. J. L. 553, 1 A.2d 32 (1938).
13. See National Homeopathic Hospital Association v. Britton, Deputy Comm'r.
s"pro at 564.
14. See McCahill, Rehabilitation and Placement of Ilsndicapped Wiorkers, 67
MONTHLY LABOR Rev. 282 (Sept. 1948).
15. See note 10 supro.
16. For those states which now have second-injury-fund provisions in their Compen-
sation Laws see ANALYSIS OF PROVISIONS OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws AND
DISCUSSION OF COVERAGEs 40 (1948) (prepared by the Insurance Department of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States).
